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REMARKS ON WRITING SEPARATELY
Ruth Bader Ginsburg*
Abstract: Judge Ginsburg compares the styles of appellate opinion writing in United
States courts and in those of Great Britain and the civil law countries. She describes as a
"middle way" the United States practice of opinions for the court, sometimes accompa-
rmed by separate concurrences and dissents. This practice, she observes, contrasts with the
British tradition of seriatim opinions by each member of the bench, and with the single,
anonymous judgment characteristic of civil law systems. While noting that the Anglo-
United States practice of writing separately has gained adherents in the civil law world,
she concludes that judges in the United States might profitably consider the styles of
jurists abroad and exercise greater restraint before writing separately.
Last summer I had the good fortune to be part of a small delegation
to Pans, led by Supreme Court Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and
Antonm Scalia. We assembled to exchange views with representatives
of the Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil d'Etat is a marvelous, multi-func-
tion institution established in Napoleon's time;' one of its main sec-
tions serves as the Supreme Court of France for admimstrative law
cases. 2 Early in our second session, Justice O'Connor described the
doctrine current in the Umted States concerning the respect or defer-
ence courts owe to decisions or rules made by expert admimstrative
agencies or officials. Courts are bound to accept an admimstrative
agency's construction of the statute the agency is charged to enforce,
Justice O'Connor reported, so long as the agency's reading is a plausi-
ble one, even if not the only plausible reading or, in the judge's view,
the more or most plausible reading.'
How can that be, a French colleague asked. How can the law have
more than one plausible meaning? Or, more accurately, how can a
court judgment openly so acknowledge? The law is the law There
can be but one officially correct reading. Shouldn't judges, at least in
their official pronouncements, make it appear so to the public? Isn't it
the court's responsibility to identify by judgment the (one and only)
correct interpretation?
Both sides of the exchange immediately recognized that we had
broached one of the fundamental differences in our systems and the
* U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit. The Author acknowledges with
appreciation the assistance of her 1988-89 law clerk, Jess Velona. This Article is the manuscript
of the Jurisprudential Lecture delivered on May 11, 1989 at the University at Washington School
of Law.
1. See L. BROWN & J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 18-19, 30-40 (1967).
2. See id. at 19-21, 34-35.
3. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
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workways of judges. Under the French practice, still followed in large
measure in most civil law systems, judicial decisions typically portray
the result demanded by the law as inexorable.4 There is a right
answer. It is expressed in a unanimous judgment, written up in a for-
mal, impersonal, concise, stylized manner. The author of the judg-
ment is neither named nor otherwise identifiable.5
In the United States, by contrast, court decisions recognize openly
that the law is not always clear and certain, that the legislator often
allows broad scope for interpretation, sometimes wittingly, other times
inadvertently. We permit our appellate judges to disagree or distance
themselves from the court's judgment by dissenting or concurring
opinion. At the same time, we have doctrines, like deference to expert
administrative determinations, that serve, among other purposes,6 to
keep the individuality of our judges within tolerable bounds.
In this talk, I will comment on the uses and abuses of separate opin-
ions in United States judicial decisionmaking.7 As background, I will
first describe three patterns of appellate judgments by collegial courts:
seriatim opinions by each member of the bench, which is the British
tradition; a single anonymous judgment with no dissent made public,
which is the civil law prototype; and the middle way familiar in the
United States-generally an opinion for the court, from which individ-
ual judges sometimes disassociate themselves in varying degrees. In
concluding comment, I will suggest that, just as the separate opinion is
making inroads in the civil law world, so United States appellate
judges might profitably exercise greater restraint before writing
separately.
I.
The British Law Lords serve as their nation's Supreme Court. They
generally sit in panels of five.8 When a decision issues, each panel
4. See Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 227, 227 (1986) ("No matter
how dissimilar the judges may be in temperament and outlook, they are united on the need to
foster the myth of the law's impersonality and inexorability.").
5. See Nadelmann, The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415
(1959).
6. In addition to respect for agency expertise, the deference doctrine reflects the principle that
the political branches of government bear responsibility for making policy choices. See Chevron,
467 U.S. at 865-66.
7. For particularly excellent commentary, from which this discussion has profited, see
Kelman, supra note 4.
8. See L. BLOM-COOPER & G. DREWRY, FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF
LORDS IN ITS JUDICIAL CAPACITY 523 (1972) [hereinafter FINAL APPEAL]; A. PATERSON, THE
LAW LORDS 110 (1982).
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member, in turn, announces his individual judgment; in constitutional
theory or form, the Law Lord is simply delivering a "speech" in the
upper chamber of Parliament.9 No composite judgment of the court
need be rendered and, up to the 1980's, a "laissez-faire ethos on con-
currences and dissents" prevailed.1" "'Threats' to write [separately]
or to dissent, or 'offers' of silence carry little weight" in the British
tradition, and the presiding Law Lord customarily has not endeavored
to reconcile differences of opinion."
There are two notable exceptions to this British tradition. The first
concerns the Privy Council, which for centuries has heard appeals
from the highest courts of the colonies and dominions of the Empire.
Until 1966, the Privy Council employed a single-judgment technique;
it published only unanimous, anonymous decisions.1" The formal jus-
tification for this deviation was that the Council functioned (in theory)
as adviser to the Crown and therefore should render its advice with
one voice. 3 Another explanation may more accurately or practically
account for the institution and persistence of the Privy Council's sin-
gle-judgment system: There were "policy considerations in the heyday
of Imperial power which dictated a single clear pronouncement for
subject peoples not attuned to the institutions and conventions of their
Imperial masters."1 4
A second exception to the separate opinion tradition relates to crim-
inal cases and has its principal application at the intermediate court
level. It is an idea worth pondering:1
5
In English criminal appeals, it has long been regarded as imperative
that the discomfiture of the unsuccessful appellant should not be aggra-
vated by an overt division of opinion among the judges. To the crimi-
nal, punishment itself is bitter enough, without the salt of a favourable
but impotent dissenting judgment being rubbed into the wound.
Under the statute today in force, separate opinions may be presented
in criminal appeals only when the presiding judge so authorizes.16
9. FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 81-82.
10. A. PATERSON, supra note 8, at 109.
11. Id. at 106, 109; cf w. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 59 (1964), quoting a
message Justice Stone wrote to Justice Frankfurter about an opinion Frankfurter was drafting:
"'If you wish to write, placing the case on the ground which I think tenable and desirable, I shall
cheerfully join you. If not, I will add a few observations for myself.'"
12. See FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 82.
13. See ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration,
44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 188 (1959).
14. FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 82.
15. Id. at 81.
16. Id.
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In contrast to the British tradition of opinions separately rendered
by each judge as an individual, the civil law tradition calls for a collec-
tive, corporate judgment. Disagreement on the law or its proper appli-
cation nowadays is almost universally admitted to be inevitable some
of the time.17 But according to civil law custom, disagreement is not
disclosed. Cases are decided with a single, per curiam opinion. In the
French tradition, the judgment is tightly and precisely composed;
commentators familiar with the system report that the ideal judgment
is "considered all the more perfect for its concise and concentrated
style, so that only experienced jurists are able to understand and
admire it."' 8 In some continental countries, West Germany and Italy
among them, however, the pattern is different; "the judicial decision is
presented in the form of a [relatively long] dissertation," which may
include references to previous court decisions or scholarly
commentary.' 9
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia tells of a semester's visit of
one of his children with a family abroad, and the clear approval and
respect accorded the child's statement that her father was a law pro-
fessor. When the Scalia child reported, on a return visit, that her
father had become a federal judge on the D.C. Circuit, the change in
occupation bewildered the foreign family. Why would a tenured pro-
fessor want to join the ranks of the judiciary? One of the reasons for
the unanimous, anonymous style of judging in civil law countries is the
civil service character and mentality of judiciaries outside the common
law realm.
Numbers tell the story, in large part. The highest civil court in
France, the Cour de Cassation, has over four score members, 20 and
the counterpart highest civil court in West Germany numbers over
one hundred judges.2 ' In common law countries, most judges are
"appointed from among practising advocates at the height of their rep-
utation."' 22  In most civil law systems, judging generally is "a career
17. See Anand, The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication,
14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 788, 790 (1965); see also Hambro, Dissenting and Individual Opinions in
the International Court of Justice, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT
UND VOLLKERRRECHT 229, 230 (1956-57) (in all supreme courts, "[ilt must be a common
experience that the judges do not always agree.., probably nobody today indulges in the illusion
of unanimous courts").
18. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 129 (2d ed.
1978).
19. Id. at 130; see also infra note 24.
20. M. AMOS & F. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 8 (F. Lawson, A. Anton &
L. Neville Brown 3d ed. 1967).
21. D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 50-51 (1976).
22. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 18, at 127.
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entered at the beginning of one's professional life."2 3 Speaking of the
"judicial establishment" in West Germany, for example, one commen-
tator explained:24
The psychological link between bench and civil service is deeply
rooted. During Imperial Germany and the Weimar period judges were
regarded as part of the civil service.... Though judges now enjoy
independent status.. ., the two professions are still similarly structured
with comparable tenure, salaries, ranks, promotion procedures, and
retirement conditions.... The typical appointee begins his career in the
lowest court. His ascent within the judiciary is uncommonly slow. Pro-
motion depends usually on the recommendation of higher-ranking
judges.
In sync with the anonymous institutional opinion typical in civil law
countries is the "reporter" system at work in many continental or con-
tinental-style courts.25 Customarily, a case on appeal is initially
assigned to one judge, as the "reporter" judge, who bears responsibil-
ity for its preparation. That judge immerses herself in the case and
develops a report plus recommended disposition. In most cases, as
one might expect, the reporter's recommendation carries the day.2 6
Finally, in comprehending the different common and civil law
styles, one must understand that civil law judgments formally do not
count as precedent-the rule of stare decisis does not officially hold
23. Id. For recent commentary, see Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in
France, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1757, 1758-61 (1988) (French magistrates drawn from law
graduates, and enter Judicial College by competitive examination before the age of 28;
administrative judges drawn from regular civil service); Clark, The Selection and Accountability
of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1795, 1802-06
(1988) (legal trainees who pass two stages of state exams are eligible for judiciary); Merryman,
How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865 (1988).
24. D. KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 53; see also Clark, supra note 23, at 1820-22. But cf. id.
at 1829-32 (lay judges serve on many West German courts of first instance, and some appellate
courts).
Respecting promotion opportunities for judges in Italy, a leading authority wrote:
Since [the judge's] chances of promotion will depend on the decision of a commission of
higher magistrates who will evaluate his qualifications (which will be judged primarily on
the opinions he has written), it is only natural that as the time approaches when he is to
come up for promotion he will be led to neglect those phases of his profession that offer little
opportunity for recognition but are of basic importance to the service of justice (e.g., the
work of the examining magistrate in criminal cases), and to give preference to the type of
work that enables him to make the most favorable impression on his future examiners. It is
for this reason that judges who are nearing promotion tend to display their knowledge of
jurisprudence by writing decisions as if they were preparing scholarly dissertations; for they
know that to a promotion committee a learned decision is worth more than a just one.
P. CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 43-44 (1956).
25. See D. KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 52.
26. See id. at 180, 192.
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sway. 27 The notion that courts do not set precedent no doubt figures
in the cast of opinions. Unanimity today does not necessarily imply a
judgment's staying power tomorrow, particularly when commentators
in the legal academic community return unfavorable reviews.2 1
In the United States, we credit Chief Justice John Marshall with
establishing the practice of announcing the Court's judgment in a sin-
gle opinion for the Court.2 9 In this matter, as in some others, Mar-
shall's will prevailed over Jefferson's. Jefferson, a defender of seriatim
opinions, said of the Marshall Court's one judgment, one opinion for
the Court practice:3"
An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one,
delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or
timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his
own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning.
Opinions for the court remain standard in our Supreme Court and in
the federal courts of appeals as well, although separate opinions are
not uncommon. Even Marshall, during his Chief Justiceship, dis-
sented on several occasions and once specially concurred.3 1 As in
civilian systems, we have but one judgment, and we mark it the
Court's. But in tune with the British tradition, we place no formal
constraints on the prerogative of each judge to speak out separately.
II.
In the civil law pattern, anonymity (faceless or nameless judgments)
and unanimity (one judgment, no divergent individual opinions) go
together. Before turning to the separate opinion, I will comment on
the value and the price of disclosing a court's votes and the names of
opinion authors.
27. See J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 551-87 (1978). Stare decisis, however, has a strong unifying force
in common law systems. The need to "fit[ ] the current decision into the body of past decisions"
operates to "reduce[ ] individuality of judgment." Kelman, supra note 4, at 229.
28. See D. KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 200-201 (West Germany); R. DAVID & H. DE VRIES,
THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 124-25 (1958) ("vigor of the criticism often directed at French
court decisions by learned commentators is equalled only by the forceful written dissents
accompanying Anglo-American decisions"); see generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 59-64 (1969).
29. See ZoBell, supra note 13, at 193; see also White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court
1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1984).
30. ZoBell, supra note 13, at 194 (quoting Letter to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), cited in
12 P. FORD, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175-79 (1905)).
31. Id. at 196 & n.57.
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Disclosure of votes and opinion writers may nourish a judge's ego,
his or her sense of individuality; but if our system affords the judge
personal satisfaction, it also serves to hold the individual judge
accountable. The process of writing signed opinions is a testing ven-
ture. California's once Chief Justice Roger Traynor wrote of the
process:32
I have not found a better test for the solution of a case than its articula-
tion in writing, which is thinking at its hardest. A judge.., often dis-
covers that his tentative views will not jell in the writing. He wrestles
with the devil more than once to set forth a sound opinion that will be
sufficient unto more than the day.
The prospect of a dissent or separate concurring statement pointing
out an opinion's inaccuracies and inadequacies strengthens the test; it
heightens the opinion writer's incentive to "get it right."
33
In the press to keep up with a mounting case load, my circuit and
others nowadays dispose of a high percentage of cases by unpublished
judgment, sometimes accompanied by concise memorandum.34 These
abbreviated dispositions are, without exception, unsigned and, almost
without exception, unanimous. I betray no confidence when I tell you
that unsigned work products, more often than signed opinions, are
fully composed by hands other than a judge's own - by staff attorneys
or law clerks - and let out with scant editing by the supervising
panel. Judges generally do not labor over unpublished judgments and
memoranda, or even published per curiam opinions, with the same
intensity they devote to signed opinions. As a bright commentator
observed in a related context: "When anonymity of pronouncement is
combined with security in office, it is all too easy for the politically
insulated officials to lapse into arrogant ipse dixits.
' 35
There are exceptions, however, that we notice specially because they
deviate from the norm. A published opinion without authorship attri-
bution may be particularly forceful in certain contexts. Consider, for
example, the extra weight carried by the Supreme Court's 1958 per
curiam opinion in Cooper v. Aaron;36 in that case all nine Justices
signed onto a statement for the court reaffirming-in face of official
32. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV.
211, 218 (1957).
33. See Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 205, 206-07, 216
(1985).
34. See id. at 218-23.
35. Kelman, supra note 4, at 242.
36. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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resistance in Little Rock, Arkansas-that desegregation in public
schools is indeed the law of the land.37
Public accountability through the disclosure of votes and opinion
authors puts the judge's conscience and reputation on the line,"8 and
the repercussions are sometimes severe. Justice Blackmun, for exam-
ple, continues to be targeted for attack because, over sixteen years ago,
he carried out an assignment given to him by then Chief Justice Bur-
ger; he wrote the Court's opinion on women's access to abortion, Roe
v. Wade,39 a 7-2 judgment. The storm following such a decision may
sweep away judges who lack the cushion of life tenure. (The majority
of our states, I note, still provide for periodic election or reappoint-
ment of judges.) Consider the fate of California's once Chief Justice
Rose Bird and her two colleagues, Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin,
in the well-financed, successful 1986 campaign against their retention
on the California Supreme Court. One commentator wrote in relation
to that campaign and its focus on single issues:'
Good judges reaching well-reasoned and even precedentially-restrained
results in one particularly controversial case are seriously at risk if a
majority of the electorate feels strongly enough about the one issue. Jus-
tices who lack principle so that they bend to the pressure of popular
opinion will be retained. This places too much external pressure upon
the justices.
There is security in anonymity as these illustrations attest. But the
judge who works under an anonymity cloak "has nothing like the
prominence of the common law judge."41  Judges nameless to the
public who write stylized judgments do not command the moral force
judges in the United States sometimes demonstrate. Consider the
37. Circuit courts too may issue an opinion per curiam to underscore the panel's unanimity in
a sensitive case. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United
States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam; en bane) (Pentagon
Papers), aff'd sub nom. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
38. See Kelman, supra note 4, at 241.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections and the
California Supreme Court, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 812, 823 (1986); see Thompson, Judicial Retention
Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988); see also Ginsburg, Confirming Supreme Court Justices: Thoughts on
the Second Opinion Rendered by the Senate, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 101, 115-17. One of the
defeated California Justices, Joseph Grodin, similarly commented that basing judicial retention
elections on "whether voters do or do not like the results in particular cases ... would create an
atmosphere in which judges, if they wished to retain their seats, would have a powerful incentive
to conform their decisions to the tides of public opinion." Grodin, Developing a Consensus of
Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1979
(1988).
41. M. AMos & F. WALTON, supra note 20, at 9.
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brave performance of certain Fifth Circuit judges and, even more
notably, certain district judges in the south in their valiant endeavor to
secure compliance with the Supreme Court's school desegregation
decision, Brown v. Board of Education.42 I recall, as an example,
words written in 1956 by my former D.C. Circuit colleague, Judge J.
Skelly Wright. He was at that time a district judge in New Orleans.
The words appear in one of his many orders aimed at desegregating
the city's public schools. Judge Wright put his name on the line, his
personal safety at risk, and the style is plainly his own:43
The problem of changing a people's mores, particularly those with an
emotional overlay, is not to be taken lightly. It is a problem which will
require the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and forbearance
from all of us, of whatever race. But the magnitude of the problem may
not nullify the principle. And that principle is that we are, all of us,
freeborn Americans, with a right to make our way, unfettered by sanc-
tions imposed by man because of the work of God.
Judges on appellate courts in the United States, even those tenured
"during good Behaviour" 44  and thus sheltered from electoral
accountability, constantly experience internal pressures-the compet-
ing tugs of collegiality and individuality. Justice Brennan, speaking of
his repeated dissents in death penalty cases, said:45
[T]his type of dissent constitutes a statement by the judge as an individ-
ual: "Here I draw the line." Of course, as a member of a court, one's
general duty is to acquiesce in the rulings of that court and to take up
the battle behind the court's new barricades. But it would be a great
mistake to confuse this unquestioned duty to obey and respect the law
with an imagined obligation to subsume entirely one's own views of con-
stitutional imperatives to the views of the majority.
When to acquiesce and when to go it alone is a question our system
allows each judge to resolve for herself.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); J. PELTASON, FIFrY-EIGHT
LONELY MEN (1971); F. READ & L. McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL
INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978).
43. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337, 342 (E. D. La. 1956), aff'd, 242
F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
44. U.S. CONST. ART. III prescribes: "The Judges... shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." See generally Edwards, Regulating Judicial
Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765 (1989);
Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55
U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1983).
45. Brennan, In Defense of Dissent, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 437 (1986).
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Some judges are more prone to indulge their individuality than
others, but all operate under one intensely practical constraint: time.
Professor Paul Freund wrote of Justice Brandeis, for whom he
clerked: "Not infrequently the preparation of a dissenting opinion was
foregone because the demands of other items of work prevented an
adequate treatment .... 46 In collegial courts, one gets no writing
credit for dissenting or concurring opinions; however consuming the
preparation of a separate opinion may be, the judge must still carry a
full load of opinions for the court. Dissents or concurrences are writ-
ten on one's own time.
The danger of crying wolf too often also inhibits separate opinions.
Justice Holmes was called "The Great Dissenter," but he in fact dis-
sented less often than most of his colleagues.4 7 Chief Justice Stone, a
public defender of the right to dissent, once wrote to Karl Llewellyn,
another advocate of separate opinions: "You know, if I should write in
every case where I do not agree with some of the views expressed in
the opinions, you and all my other friends would stop reading [my
separate opinions]. '"48
Concern for the well-being of the court on which one serves, for the
authority and respect its pronouncements command, may be the most
powerful deterrent to writing separately. Professor Freund recently
recalled his memory of Justice Cardozo's first year on the Supreme
Court:
4 9
When I was a law clerk ... I had access to the docket book of Justice
Brandeis. It was burned with the others at the end of the term, and I
hope that still obtains. But I was surprised, looking at the docket book,
how often Justice Cardozo was in sole dissent in the vote at confer-
ence. ... I... surmise [it was] because he was fresh from the New York
Court of Appeals, many of the cases at conference were common law
cases and he may have had a different view . .. from the prevailing
federal rule.
... I was also struck by how preponderant his course was of sup-
pressing a dissent so that an opinion would come down unanimous ....
Professor Alexander Bickel, in his book The Unpublished Opinions
of Mr. Justice Brandeis,5" reported dissenting opinions Justice
46. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 71 (1950).
47. See ZoBell, supra note 13, at 202.
48. W. MURPHY, supra note 11, at 62.
49. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Professor Paul A. Freund: "A Colloquy,"
Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit (May 24,
1989), reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 241, 347 (1988).
50. A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957).
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Brandeis drafted, and circulated among his colleagues, sometimes win-
ning changes in votes, sometimes achieving alterations in majority
opinions. Even when Brandeis failed to win concessions, however, he
would refrain from publishing the dissent if the majority opinion,
though incorrect in his judgment, was narrow and unlikely to cause
real harm in future cases.51 Judge Jerome Frank, in a review of
Bickel's book, said of the Brandeis performance: 2
Brandeis was a great institutional man. He realized that the Court is
not the place for solo performances, that random dissents and concur-
rences weaken the institutional impact of the Court and handicap it in
the doing of its fundamental job. Dissents and concurrences need to be
saved for major matters if the Court is not to appear indecisive and
quarrelsome, [for] the appearance of indecision and quarrelsomeness are
drains on the energy of the institution, leaving it in weakened condition
at'those moments when the call upon it for public leadership is great-
est.... To have discarded some of [his separate] opinions is a supreme
example of sacrifice to strength and consistency of the Court. And he
has his reward: his shots are all the harder because he chose his ground.
What do separate opinions contribute to the improvement or pro-
gress of the law? Most immediately, when drafted and circulated
among the judges,53 they may provoke clarifications, refinements,
modifications in the court's opinion. They provide, as Chief Justice
Stone said, "some assurance to counsel and to the public that decision
has not been perfunctory, which is one of the most important objects
of opinion-writing."54 In the category of "minor practical advan-
tages," a British jurist noted the consolation a dissent may afford the
first instance trier: "A contented trial judge," that reporter observed,
"is a better and more confident judge than one who experiences noth-
ing but discouragement from the appellate courts."55 (Court of
appeals judges, whether writing for the court or separately, should
remember the district judge's definition of appellate judges: "They are
the ones who lurk in the hills while the battle rages; then, when the
battle is over, they descend from the hills and shoot all the wounded.")
Separate opinions in intermediate appellate courts serve an alert
function. If appeal from the court's judgment is a matter of right, the
51. Id. at 28.
52. Frank, Book Review, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 401, 404 (1958) (reviewing A. BICKEL, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957)).
53. See Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 214-17.
54. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 JUDICATURE 78 (1942).
55. FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 89.
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separate opinion may assist the court of next resort by charting alter-
nate grounds of decision. If further review is discretionary, as in the
U.S. Supreme Court, a separate opinion may signal to the Court that
the case is troubling and perhaps worthy of a place on its calendar.5 6
Regarding our Highest Court, in a famous dissent Holmes wrote,
tongue only partly in cheek, "it is useless and undesirable, as a rule, to
express dissent."5 7 I suspect he would agree, however, as to some
cases, with Chief Justice Hughes' celebrated statement: "A dissent in a
court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have
been betrayed.
58
Classic examples include Justice Curtis' dissent in the Dred Scott
case, 59 the first Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 6' Justice
Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York,6 t the Holmes dissent in
Abrams v. United States,6 2 the Brandeis concurrence in the result in
Whitney v. California.63 These extraordinary opinions forecast the
future in the realm of equal protection, substantive due process, and
freedom of expression.'
Justice Brennan, in the article I quoted earlier, stressed that the dis-
senter's right in the Supreme Court is exercised most appropriately
when fundamental constitutional questions are at stake.65 In constitu-
tional decisionmaking, the Court applies the doctrine of stare decisis
with somewhat muted zeal, because short of amendment, only the
Court itself can uproot its past decision. 66 When statutory interpreta-
tion is at issue, there is less cause to write with a later, wiser bench as
one's audience. Justice Brandeis counseled: "[I]n most matters it is
56. See, e.g., M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 339-40 (1970) (of 311 Second Circuit
decisions issued with dissents from 1941 to 1951, the Supreme Court reviewed 47, reversing and
so vindicating the dissenter 25 times).
57. Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
58. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1936).
59. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
60. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
61. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
62. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
63. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
64. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) ("Although no case
subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases,
there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis
rationale.").
65. See supra text accompanying note 45.
66. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); see also J. FRANK, THE MARBLE
PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 127 (1961).
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more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it
be settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a mat-
ter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legisla-
tion."16 7 Consider as an example our complex Internal Revenue Code.
Generally, is it not "better that the law should be certain than that
every judge should speculate upon improvements in it"?6"
I do not mean to suggest that dissent or other separate statement in
statutory cases is inevitably undesirable. Rather than simply "let
sleeping dogs lie,"69 a separate opinion may serve "as a call for rectifi-
cation by nonjudicial hands,"70 by Congress or an executive agency.71
"[I]t may be important for future policy-making and projected legisla-
tion that [the political branches] should know the strength of a minor-
ity view. '"72
III.
Disclosure of votes and separate opinions, I said at the start of these
remarks, have made inroads in diverse civil law settings. As examples,
I will mention international tribunals, and courts established post-
World War II in Italy and West Germany to hear and decide constitu-
tional questions.73
In international tribunals where civil law and common law jurists
come together, the practice of publishing votes and separate opinions
generally prevails. Most prominently, the International Court of Jus-
tice (World Court), seated in The Hague, operates under a 1945 stat-
ute providing: "If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part
the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to
67. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). For an earlier statement to the same effect, see Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273
U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68. The words are Lord Eldon's, in Sheddon v. Goodrich, 32 Eng. Rep. 441, 447 (Ch. 1803)
(quoted in R. WASSEnaROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 42 (1961)). For consideration of the
unusual practice of Justice Douglas, who sometimes dissented without stating his reasons in
federal tax cases, see B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER & M. SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION
(1975).
69. Justice Stevens so characterized the doctrine of stare decisis in Stevens, The Life Span of a
Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983).
70. Kelman, supra note 4, at 241.
71. See, eg., Brock ex reL Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134, 1152-53 & n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, concurring) ("Congressional attention to this matter
may well be in order.").
72. FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 89.
73. On the introduction of dissenting opinions in Japan after World War II and in newly
independent states in South and CentralAmerica, see Nadelmann, supra note 5, at 421-22; see
also E. MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 25 (1986) (Japan).
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deliver a separate opinion."74 Similarly, the European Court of
Human Rights, seated in Strasbourg, from its inception in 1950-51 has
functioned with full disclosure of separate opinions.75
In contrast, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, as
organized in 1957, adheres to a principle of formal unanimity and does
not permit publication of dissenting opinions.76 Two factors indicate
why. First, the six original members of the European Communities
(Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Ger-
many) are civil law nations with traditions against disclosure of votes
and publication of separate opinions; the United Kingdom did not
become a member of the Communities until 1973. Second, the judges
of the European Communities Court serve relatively short, but renew-
able, six-year terms and there is concern that "publication of separate
dissenting opinions could subject [them] to exacting political scrutiny
in times of reappointment, perhaps deterring some judges from fully
exercising their complete impartiality."77
Both Italy and West Germany, after World War II, established spe-
cial tribunals empowered to decide constitutional questions. 78 Consti-
tutional review by courts is not traditional in either country. These
relatively new institutions, which stand apart from the regular judicial
hierarchy, admit dissent. A judge of the Italian Constitutional Court
may record a dissenting vote, but only the judgment of the Court is
published.79 A larger adjustment was ordered for West Germany's
Constitutional Court; pursuant to a 1970 statute, that Court may pub-
lish dissenting and concurring opinions." Responding to the concern
that reappointment considerations might influence a judge's votes, the
same 1970 statute established a relatively long, and nonrenewable,
74. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 15 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 355, 362 (1945); see
Anand, supra note 17, at 778. On the World Court generally, SEE E. MCWHINNEY, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1987).
75. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 51, § 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 248.
76. See Grementieri & Golden, The United Kingdom and the European Court of Justice: An
Encounter Between Common and Civil Law Traditions, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 664, 669-70 (1973).
See generally L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (2d ed. 1983).
77. Grementieri & Golden, supra note 76, at 670; see also L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, supra note
76, at 234-35.
78. See Nadelmann, Non-Disclosure of Dissents in Constitutional Courts: Italy and West
Germany, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 268 (1964). On latter twentieth century constitutional review in
diverse systems, see generally M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1979); M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971).
79. See Grementieri & Golden, supra note 76, at 671.
80. See id. at 670-71.
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twelve-year term for all Constitutional Court judges.81 In the first few
years under the statutory permission, dissenting opinions issued in
West Germany's Constitutional Court in ten percent of all cases
decided by full opinion.82 That is about the same dissent rate as in
U.S. Courts of Appeals,8" but it is modest indeed when compared
with the U.S. Supreme Court where the rate of non-unanimous deci-
sions in the same period ran over seventy percent. 84
Turning back to the United States to conclude these comments,
unanimity in the federal courts of appeals, as I just stated, hovers
around the ninety percent mark; the occurrence of separate opinions
at that level has not changed significantly in recent decades. In the
Supreme Court, the picture is notably different. The rate of non-unan-
imous decisions mounted from under twenty percent in the early
1900s85 to over seventy percent in the middle 1980S.86 The ratio of
dissenting opinions to majority opinions was less than ten percent in
the early 1900s; in the middle 1980s, in number, majority and dissent-
ing opinions ran just about even. 87
Addressing a German audience in the early 1930s, Karl Llewellyn
responded to the argument that dissents harmfully disturb the security
of the law by fostering "a sense of legal uncertainty."88 "[S]eparate
opinions," Llewellyn reported, "are found in only a small percentage
of cases," and by their very infrequency, "serve to reassure people
about legal certainty." 89 That reassurance is not currently operative at
our nation's highest judicial instance.
81. D. KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 88-89.
82. Id. at 195.
83. See Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 212 & n.36.
84. See, eg., The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 43, 276 (1974).
85. See Palmer, Dissents and Overrulings: A Study of Developments in the Supreme Court, 34
A.B.A. J. 554, 555 (1948).
86. In the 1985 term, for example, 71% of the Court's full opinions included at least one
dissent. An additional 10% contained at least one concurrence. See The Supreme Court, 1985
Term: Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 100, 306 (1986). In the 1987 term, however, over 35
percent of the Court's full opinions were unanimous and close to 44 percent issued without
dissent. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REv. 143, 352
(1988); Caplan, Rehnquist New and Improved?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 40, 45.
87. In the 1986 term, there were 152 full opinions for the Court and 154 dissents. The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 362 (1987). In the 1987
term, there were 142 full opinions for the Court, and 97 dissents. The Supreme Court, 1987
Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. RaV. 143, 350 (1988).
88. K. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, excerpted in 88 COLUM. L. REV.
989, 1003 (1988).
89. Id.
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Federal judges at all levels complain of too many and increasingly
complex cases. 9° But even overworked lower federal court judges
must concede that the Supreme Court's business has become harder.
The Judges' Bill of 1925 gave the Highest Court discretion, in most
circumstances, to select the decisions it believes warrant review,9 and
that discretion has now become virtually complete. 92 The impact of
the Court's certiorari policy-the near disappearance of easy cases-
became evident in the 1940s, as the dissent rate moved to over sixty
percent. Hard cases do not inevitably make bad law, but too often
they produce multiple opinions.
More unsettling than the high incidence of dissent is the prolifera-
tion of separate opinions with no single opinion commanding a clear
majority. 93 The opening paragraph of the Court's 1988 decision in
Boos v. Barry9 4 is illustrative:95
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II-B, and V, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS,
and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and with respect to Parts III and IV, in which
all participating Members joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-
A, in which STEVENS and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
MARSHALL, J., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, in which WHITE and BLACK-
MUN, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
Keen observers have suggested that this type of performance, if it
does not signal even less collegiality on the Supreme Court than in
earlier generations, may be attributed to the multiplication of law
clerks.9 6 Justice Brandeis, as Professor Freund related, put aside some
potential dissents for lack of time to reflect and to write.9 7 Brandeis
had only one clerk; today most Justices have four, to say nothing of
90. See, e.g., Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice
and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648 (1980).
91. Pub. L. No. 415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925).
92. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662.
93. See generally Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme
Court, 1974 Duke L.J. 59; Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1127 (1981); Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980).
94. 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988).
95. Id. at 1160.
96. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102-19, 230-41 (1985);
Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts, 32
CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 799 (1983).
97. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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more efficient means to retrieve and process words. Has our Supreme
Court drifted from its once customary middle way-an opinion for the
court sometimes accompanied by a separate opinion-toward the Law
Lords' pattern of seriatim opinions, each carrying equal weight, and
under which "the English lawyer has often to pick his way through as
many as five judgments to find the highest common factor binding on
lower courts"?98
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner has urged that, before writ-
ing separately, or publishing a separate writing, a judge pause to pon-
der the question: Is this dissent or concurrence really necessary? 99
Instead of exaggerating what one's colleague has written, and then
"blast[ing] away at the alleged excess,"" might it sometimes be pru-
dent to acquiesce provisionally, even if dubitante,1° ' to withhold
speaking separately and at length "at least long enough to see how [the
majority's rule] works"?. 2
Judge Posner suggests that more sensitivity to one's colleagues, and
less amour-propre, on the part of court opinion authors as "well as
potential separate writers, could reduce the number of separate con-
curring statements that "register a minor reservation," "suggest addi-
tional reasons for the result," or "criticize a dissenting opinion. 10 3
The opinion author should be open to incorporating the ideas of others
voting on the same side, and the potential separate writer should
appreciate that he holds no copyright or other "proprietary interest"
in his ideas. 1"
Particularly problematic among separate concurring statements is
the one setting out the writer's interpretation of what the majority
opinion really means (or should mean). Such restatements, resembling
certain assenting judgments of Law Lords, may "fudge the areas of
real agreement," or contain "in the[ir] interstices... all the signs of
partial dissent without the benefit of the clear hallmark of a dissenting
98. See Final Appeal, supra note 8, at 90.
99. See R. POSNER, supra note 96, at 232-42. The question's phrasing borrows from the title
of a seminal article on choice of law: Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
REv. 657 (1959).
100. FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 87; R. POSNER, supra note 96, at 233 ("The abusive
dissent characteristically exaggerates and distorts the holding of the majority opinion, to the
confusion of the bar and lower court judges.").
101. See FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 86 & n.l.
102. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66-68 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)
(objecting to swift overruling of Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), and advocating a
"wait-to-see" approach, though Black had dissented in Trupiano).
103. R. POSNER, supra note 96, at 239-41.
104. Id. at 240.
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judgment";10 5 they may thus be "deceptive," even "insidious," serv-
ing to confuse or "trip up" the incautious or unsophisticated reader.'0 6
Judges on appellate tribunals, I noted earlier, live daily with the
competing claims or demands of collegiality and individuality. It is up
to each judge to keep those claims in fair balance. I hope what I have
said suggests that jurists in the United States might serve the public
better if they heightened their appreciation of the values so prized in
the civil law tradition: clarity and certainty in judicial
pronouncements. 07
Our Chief Justice, some observers have suggested, 10 8 may be setting
the example. As an Associate Justice, his dissent rate was high.'o9 In
his first term as Chief Justice, he wrote the fewest separate opinions-
nine dissents compared to Justice Stevens' high of thirty-two, no sepa-
rate concurring statements, compared to Justice Scalia's seventeen." 0
In his second term, Chief Justice Rehnquist's total separate statements
also numbered nine: seven were dissents, two were concurrences.'"
While it is too soon to make reliable appraisals," 2 if the Chief Justice
is calling for more collegiality and caring for one's court as an institu-
tion,t t3 I heartily concur, and would add no further words.
105. FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 93. For an example I confess to having supplied, see
Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, Ruth
Bader, concurring), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988).
106. FINAL APPEAL, supra note 8, at 93; R. POSNER, supra note 96, at 240.
107. See Griswold, supra note 96, at 799-800.
108. See, e.g., Taylor, Rehnquist's Court, Tuning Out the White House, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
September 11, 1988, at 38.
109. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1984 Term: Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 322
(1985) (Rehnquist ranked third among Justices with fifteen dissenting opinions); The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 77, 289 (1980) (Rehnquist ranked first with twenty-six
dissents); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 296
(1976) (noting "frequency of [Rehnquist's] lone dissent"). But see infra note 112.
110. See The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 362
(1987).
111. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 350
(1988).
112. See Rohde & Spaeth, Ideology, Strategy, and Supreme Court Decisions: William
Rehnquist as Chief Justice, 72 JUDICATURE 247, 250 (1989) (based on data drawn from National
Science Foundation-funded U.S. Supreme Court judicial data base project, authors state that-
contrary to popular opinion and press comment-a systematic study of the Chief Justice's votes
"indicates that Rehnquist, as chief justice, has not changed his views or strategic behavior," nor
is there "appreciable change in his voting in unanimous decisions ... or cases in which he is the
sole dissenter").
113. See Caplan, supra note 86.
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